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I. INTRODUCTION

JUDGE: Counsel, I assume you are both prepared to proceed.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR: That is correct, Your Honor.
JUDGE: Very well, proceed.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, the Defendant moves for a continuance based on the grounds that the prosecuting attorney has failed to
comply with the Defendant's request for discoverable materials.
JUDGE: Counsel?
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, the Defense Counsel has refused to pay for
the costs of the reproduction of the materials; therefore, the Prosecutor's
Office has decided to abstain from disclosure until the Defense reimburses
the office for costs incurred in making the copies.
JUDGE: Are you telling me that the Prosecutor's Office charges defense
attorneys for making copies of the materials the Defense requests via
discovery?
PROSECUTOR: That is correct, Your Honor. Due to the time burden and
rising costs of discovery, the Prosecutor's Office has decided to charge
defense attorneys for the costs of reproducing the materials. However, the
charge is only applicable to privately-retained defense attorneys. In the
case of a defendant who has been determined to be indigent by the court,
the charge is waived.
JUDGE: How much is this charge counsel?
PROSECUTOR: Ten cents per sheet, Your Honor.
JUDGE: Counsel, you have two hours to comply with the discovery
request or you will be held in contempt.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR: Thank you, Your Honor.
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A. PEOPLE V. HUNTLEY: THE ISSUE

An exchange similar to the hypothetical above took place in a courtroom in Jackson County, Illinois on January 23, 1985.1 In People v.
Huntley, the Defendant was charged by information with theft and
burglary. 2 Prior to the Defendant's preliminary hearing, his privatelyretained attorney filed a request for relevant police reports. The State's
Attorney's Office implemented a program that charged privately-retained
defense attorneys for the costs involved in reproducing the requested police
reports because "the copying of the reports became time consuming and
costly." 4 At the Defendant's preliminary hearing, the Defendant's attorney
refused to pay the charge; therefore, the Assistant State's Attorney
prosecuting the case decided not to comply with the Defendant's request for
production of the materials. 5
Despite the trial judge's order to produce the material, the Assistant
State's Attorney persisted in his refusal to comply with the Defendant's
request for production. Consequently, the Assistant was found in criminal
contempt and was fined ten dollars. 6 The State appealed the criminal
contempt order arguing that the court lacked "authority to order the State's
Attorney to produce photocopies of the police reports, since the discovery
rules were not applicable prior to the preliminary hearing and that the State
had authority to charge privately retained counsel for [the] cost of copying
the requested police reports prior to reproduction." 7 The Huntley court
reversed the trial court's contempt charge finding that the trial court lacked
authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 411 to order the State to
comply with the discovery request because the discovery rules were
inoperative prior to a preliminary hearing.8 Therefore, the order was "void
ab initio"9 and the contempt charge had to be reversed because contempt
"will not lie where the court lacked jurisdiction to enter such an order." 10
However, in reversing the lower court's criminal contempt order based on
the resolution of the issue of whether the court lacked authority to compel
the State's Attorney to produce copies of the requested material, the
1. People v. Huntley, 493 N.E.2d 1193, 1194-95 (Ill. App. Ct., 5th Dist. 1986).
2.
Id. at 1194.
3. Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. at 1195.
6. Id.at 1194-95.
Huntley, 493 N.E.2d at 1194.
7.
8.
Id. at 1195-96.
"Ab initio" is a Latin phrase that "means 'from the beginning; from the first act;
9.
entirely; as to all acts done; in the inception."' Holland v. Ribicoff, 219 F. Supp. 274, 276-77
(D. Or. 1962) (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 8 (4th ed. 1968)).
10.
Huntley, 493 N.E.2d at 1196.
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Huntley court found it unnecessary to rule on the issue that this Comment
will address:" whether a prosecutor's office can charge privately-retained
defense attorneys for the costs the office may incur as a result of the
reproduction of materials requested via discovery. The issue has generally
not been addressed,12 and doubt or apprehension with resect to a prosecutor's authority to do so is evident throughout the country.
11.
Id.
12.
But see COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 (Part V)(c) (Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-69 (2004); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.03 (Subd. 10) (Supp. 2005); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.70
(3) (McKinney 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2002(F) (West 2003); N.M. R. MAG. CT.
CRIM. P. 6-504 committee's commentary (2005) ("The expense of copying or photographing
is to be paid by the party requesting a copy or photograph."); PA. R. CRIM. P. 573 comment
(2005) ("'The attorney for the Commonwealth should not charge the defendant for the costs
of copying pretrial discovery materials. However, nothing in this rule is intended to
preclude the attorney for the Commonwealth, on a case-by-case basis, from requesting an
order for the defendant to pay the copying costs."). See also N.M. R. MEMO. CT. CRIM. P.
7-504 committee commentary (2005); N.M. R. MuN. CT. CRIM. P. 8-504 committee
commentary (2005).
13.
See A formal survey conducted by the author of this article directed to State's
Attorney's Offices throughout Illinois, the results of which are available upon request by
contacting the Northern Illinois University College of Law - Law Review Office at (815)
753-0619 or lawreview@niu.edu (Currently, eighty-two out of the one hundred and two
State's Attorney's Offices in Illinois have responded to the survey (80%). Sixty-one Offices
(74%) do not charge for the reproduction of discoverable material; however, several of these
Offices voiced their concern with the rising costs, were interested in the results of the
survey, and would like to know if they can charge. A few of these Offices noted that if the
discovery requests were extremely voluminous they would charge for the costs of
reproduction. One Office stated that "[tihis is just a cost of doing business, and complying
with a Defendant's constitutional rights." Nineteen Offices (23%) charge the privately
retained defense attorneys to some extent; the most common being a requirement that
defense counsel provide a blank tape for the reproduction of discoverable video. Only two
Offices (3%) charge defense attorneys for the cost of reproduction.).
In West Virginia, the Putnam County Prosecutor's Office does not charge for
the reproduction of discoverable material, but the County Prosecutor voiced his concern
about future costs in light of the increasing advancements in technology. Phone conversation
with the Putnam County Prosecutor, Mark A. Sorsaia, on Nov. 8, 2005 ([304] 586-0205).
The Ritchie County Prosecutor's Office also does not currently charge for reproduction
because they did not believe that they could, but would love to if it were possible. Phone
conversation with Laurel Bee (the sole paralegal and secretary of the Office) on November
8, 2005 ([304] 643-2164). However, the Hardy County Prosecutor's Office required defense
attorneys to provide a blank tape if requesting reproduction of video recordings, otherwise,
the Office did not charge. Phone conversation with the Hardy County Prosecutor, Earl
Maxwell, on Nov. 7, 2005 ([304] 636-2053).
In Kentucky, the Breckenridge County's Attorney's Office does not charge.
Phone conversation with the Breckenridge County Attorney, Bruce Butler, on Nov. 9, 2005
([270] 756-2791). Additionally, the Madison County's Attorney's Office does not charge.
Phone conversation with the Madison County Attorney, Marc Robbins, on Nov. 7, 2005
([859] 624-4777). However, the Edmonson and the Lyon County's Attorney's Offices do
require the defense attorney to provide a blank tape or compact disk when requesting copies
of video. Phone conversation with the Edmonson County Attorney, Gregory Vincent, on
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B. THE COMMENT'S CONTENTION

This Comment proposes that a prosecutor's office may charge privately-retained defense attorneys for the costs of reproducing discoverable
material requested via discovery, and will begin with a history of the
evolution of criminal discovery. The history, while interesting, reflects that
there is a distinction between criminal and civil discovery. In addition, it
informs the reader that there are variations between the numerous approaches and provisions relating to discovery across the nation. However,
there is a relevant similarity between the various provisions with respect to
the scope of the prosecutor's duty of disclosure that is vital to the Comment's contention - primarily, the prosecutor's duty to make the discoverable material available for reproduction. Consequently, the Comment will
argue that to disallow a prosecutor the ability to charge for the costs of
reproduction would be contrary to the plain language of the majority of the
statutes and rules that govern discovery and, therefore, inimical to statutory
construction. Furthermore, the Comment will reveal public policy, which
will be extracted from other statutes, that supports its contention. Lastly, a
recommendation will be made that legislators and policymakers take action
to add provisions into existing discovery rules and statutes that will
delineate a prosecutor's ability to charge privately-retained defense
attorneys for the costs of reproducing discoverable material, and the
Comment will briefly list the few states that have already taken such
actions. However, before addressing the contention of the Comment it is
important to note what this Comment is not about: the Comment will not
discuss whether discovery should be broader or narrower, or what particular
materials are or should be discoverable. The Comment will proceed with
the presumption that the material the Comment is addressing is discoverable and that it falls within the prosecutor's duty to make the material
available and to permit its inspection and reproduction.
11. THE HISTORY OF DISCOVERY
A. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CRIMINAL DISCOVERY

The concept of discovery developed in early English common law.14
Originally, it was accomplished through a scheme of pleadings, somewhat
similar to the present day system of interrogatories.15 The scheme consisted
Nov. 7, 2005 ([270] 597-9609); phone conversation with the Lyon County Attorney, Lindell
Choat, on Nov. 7, 2005 ([270] 388-7301).
14.

Milton C. Lee, CriminalDiscovery: What Truth Do We Seek, 4 UDC L. REV. 7,

10 (1998).
15.
See id.
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of written pleadings, the objective of which "was to narrow the case to a
single triable issue of fact," 16 whereby the opponent's pleading was to deny
any allegations in the original pleading.' 7 A failure to deny an allegation
would result in an admission.' Relying on the English common law, early
American courts created a common law rule "that the judiciary lacked any
inherent authority to order pretrial discovery in criminal cases," absent
statutory authorization to the contrary. 19 This early English discovery
system proved to be inadequate, and the English courts and lawmakers
attempted to create a solution by implementing more sophisticated pretrial
discovery rules.20 An example was the use of a bill of equity by English
Courts of Chancery that included all relevant facts and circumstances in the
case, including questions for the defendant. 2' However, the constructive
admission for failure to deny the allegations was not applicable. 2
American lawmakers realized that this traditional discovery system was
insufficient,
and determined that a more adequate discovery system was
23
necessary.
Acknowledging the inadequacies of the traditional discovery system,
various formal pretrial discovery schemes began to gain support in America
and were recognized in a significant number of jurisdictions by the end of
the 1930s. 24 By mid-century, although limited in application, a majority of
the states allowed or required pretrial discovery.
The expansion in
discovery was formulated in civil cases,26 and the liberal disclosure civil
discovery provided was successful in satisfying the goal of expanded
discovery: the ascertainment of truth by avoiding "trial by surprise. 27 The
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
4 WAYNE R.

LAFAVE, JEROLD H.

IsRAEL &

NANCY J.

KING,

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE § 20.1(a) (2d ed. 1999). However, the common law rule that the judiciary
lacked inherent authority to require pretrial discovery was completely abrogated by the mid1970's, because the judiciary's power to do so was recognized "as an element of its control
over the trial process." Id. § 20.2(a) at 829.
20.
Lee, supra note 14, at 10.
21.
Id. at 10-11.
22.
Id. at 11.
23.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947).
24.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 20.1 (a) at 815.
25.
Id. ("The end result was that, by the mid-century mark, a substantial majority of
states allowed or required pretrial discovery, but such discovery was treated primarily as an
exceptional practice for a limited group of situations rather than as a standard element of
pretrial procedure.").
26.
Id. at 816 (Essentially, civil discovery allowed access to all relevant information
held by the opposing party, which included "depositions, interrogatories, production of
documents, inspection of intangible items, and physical and mental examinations."); Lee,
supra note 14, at 11.
27.
Id.at 816.
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successes of civil discovery naturally led to the inquiry of whether similar
liberal expansion should be pursued in criminal discovery. 28 This inquiry
resulted in a classic criminal procedure debate during the 1950s and
1960s.29
The issue in this debate was appropriately articulated by Justice Brennan as follows: "Should we extend to criminal prosecutions the civil pretrial discovery techniques which force both sides of a civil law suit[sic] to
put all cards on the table before trial, and tend to reduce the chance that
surprise or maneuver, rather than truth, may determine the outcome of the
trial?, 30 The primary argument of the supporters of broad criminal
discovery was that the quest for the ascertainment of truth was best
facilitated by informed counsel, rather than surprise tactics. 3' Those
opposed to more liberal criminal discovery, while acquiescing in the
principle that a trial should be a quest for truth rather than a trial by surprise
and conceding to the success of liberal civil discovery, argued that the
aggregate of three factors, in addition to alternative procedures available to
mitigate surprise, proved that the costs of liberal criminal discovery
outweighed its benefits. 32 The three factors advocated by the opponents in
distinguishing civil discovery from criminal discovery, and thus making
criminal discovery "less desirable" were:
(1) [T]he criminal defendant's privilege against selfincrimination, which would not permit the fully reciprocal
discovery found in civil practice;
(2) the greater likelihood that defense discovery in criminal
cases would be used to facilitate successful perjury; and (3)
the greater likelihood that criminal defense discovery
would lead to the intimidation of witnesses.33
Even though the debate still persists "about whether to make criminal
discovery rules as comprehensive as the civil rules[,]y 34 the issues
underlying the debate have essentially been resolved by court rules or state
28. Id.
29. Id. at 817.
William J. Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution:Sporting Event or Questfor
30.
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279 (1963).
31.
Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to
Improve the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 641, 655 (1989).
32.
LAFAvE Er AL., supra note 19, § 20.1 (b) at 818. The common procedures most
often cited by opponents as alternatives mitigating the element of surprise were preliminary
hearings, the bill of particulars, motions to suppress, and pre-trial conferences. Id.
33. Id.
34.
Lee, supra note 14, at 13.
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statutes that delineate what discovery must or may be disclosed.3 5 Today, it
is a legal maxim that there is to be discovery in criminal cases - the only
issue that still divides
the jurisdictions is "exactly how far that discovery
36
carried.,
be
should
B.

MODERN CRIMINAL DISCOVERY PROVISIONS AND A CRUCIAL
SIMILARITY: THE SCOPE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE

There are numerous variations among defense discovery statutes and
court rules across the nation, particularly with respect to preemptive effect
and what discovery is required or prohibited.37 However, the provisions
can generally be compiled into three categories: (1) provisions similar to
Federal Rule 16 (which includes "approximately a dozen states"); (2)
provisions similar to the 1970 ABA Standards (a larger number of states
fall into this category, which provides the most liberal discovery standards);
and (3) the remaining provisions, which fall somewhere in between the
Federal Rule and the ABA Standards.38 However, notwithstanding the
applicable group a discovery provision may fall into because of the
provision's scope, there are fundamental similarities between the various
provisions adopted by the states.
One such similarity is the basic structure of the provisions. 39 Generally, each statute or rule provides for the following:
(1) [Ilt establishes a procedure by which the defense and
the prosecution can put into effect the other side's obligation to make pretrial disclosure; (2) it designates those
items which shall or may (upon court order) be disclosed
by the prosecution to the defense; (3) it designates those
items that shall or may (upon court order) be disclosed by
the defense to the prosecution; (4) it establishes certain exemptions from disclosure based upon content (e.g., work
product) or, in some instances, based on the nature of the
item (e.g., witness' statements); (5) it authorizes the trial
court to issue under special circumstances a protective order that will bar or limit disclosures that would otherwise
be required; (6) it imposes a continuing duty to disclose
discoverable items so that the process automatically encompasses items acquired after the initial disclosure; and
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 20.1 (a).
Id. § 20.1(c) at 825.
Id. § 20.2(b).
Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 830.
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(7) it provides a procedure for judicial administration and
enforcement of the discovery provisions, including the imposition of sanctions.40
However, a more relevant similarity, at least with respect to the issue
addressed in this Comment, is the similarity of the provisions regarding the
scope of the prosecutor's duty of disclosure. An overwhelming majority of
the statutes and court rules that govern discovery delineate the prosecutor's
duty of disclosure as a requirement to make the discoverable material
available to the defendant and to allow the material's reproduction. 4 ' Under
Federal Rule 16, the prosecutor "must disclose to the defendant, and make
available for inspection, copying, or photographing," particular discoverable materials "upon a defendant's request., 42 The ABA Standard,
delineating an analogous duty, provides that the "prosecution should...
disclose to the defense. . . information and material and permit inspection,
copying, testing, and photographing of disclosed documents or tangible
objects ....
Similarly, the majority of the state provisions governing the
prosecution's duty of disclosure reflect the language and scope of disclosure under the Federal Rule and ABA Standard. 44
40.

Id.

44.

E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1) (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT.

41.
See e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B), (E), (F); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 223212(a),(b) (2005) (a representative of the first category of state provisions similar to the
Federal Rule, LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, at § 20.2(b), n. 25); ILL. S. CT. R. 412 (e)(i-ii)
(2005) (a representative of the second category of state provisions similar to the ABA
Standards, LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, at § 20.2(b), n. 26); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R.
16(a)(1)(A), (C), (D) (2005) (a representative of the third category of state provisions that
fall somewhere between the Federal Rule and the ABA Standards, LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 19, at § 20.2(b), n. 27); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL
BY JURY,Standard 11-2.1 (3d ed. 1996). But see MICH. R. CRiM. P. 6.201(A), (G) (2005)
(the prosecutor must provide discoverable material to the defendant); N.H. R. SUPER. CT.
98(A)(1), (2) (2005) (the prosecutor "shall provide" a copy to the defendant); N.J. R. CRIM.
P. 3:13-3(b) (2005) (the prosecutor must supply a copy of discovery of post indictment).
42.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B), (E).
43.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY,
Standard 11-2.1(a) (3d ed. 1996). Standard 11-4.2 also provides that:
Disclosure may be accomplished in any manner mutually agreeable to
the parties. Absent agreement, the party having the burden of production should: (a) notify opposing counsel that material and information,
described in general terms, may be inspected, obtained, tested, copied, or
photographed during specified reasonable times; and (b) make available
to opposing counsel at the time specified such materials and information
and suitable facilities or other arrangements for inspection, testing, copying, and photographing of such material and information.
Id. Standard 11-4.2.
ANN. § 135.805(2) (West 2005); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a)(1), (b)(1), (c), (d) (2005); WYo.
R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)(i), (C), (D) (2005).
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III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A PROSECUTOR'S ABILITY TO
CHARGE PRIVATELY-RETAINED DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR
THE COSTS INCURRED AS A RESULT OF REPRODUCING
DISCOVERABLE MATERIAL REQUESTED VIA DISCOVERY
A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

A court applies "canons of construction" when it undertakes to construe the meaning of a statute.45 These canons are merely "rules of thumb"
which aid the court in determining the intent of the legislature so that the
court can properly apply the law in any given case before the court. 46 The
first canon a court implements when interpreting a statute is the plain
language canon.4 7 The plain language canon of statutory construction
essentially reflects a presumption that "a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says .
"'u The United States
Supreme Court has determined that where the language of a statute is
unambiguous, the plain language canon is not only the first canon to be
used in interpreting a statute, but it is also the last 49 because the plain
language of the statute expresses the intent of the legislature. 50 Therefore,
"the sole function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its
terms.'
This same rule of statutory construction also applies to the
interpretation of court rules.52
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, while utilizing the canon explained above, also introduces a corollary rule to the plain language
canon. 53 In Patterson, the petitioners (the American Tobacco Co.; the
Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco Worker's International Union; and its
affiliate Local 182) were charged in 1973, "with racial discrimination in
violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981" in a class action filed by
45.
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
46. Id.
47.
E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
48.
Gernain,503 U.S. at 254.
49. Id.
50.
Patterson,456 U.S. at 68.
51.
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
52.
E.g. United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997); State v.
Greenwood, 845 P.2d 971, 975 (Wash. 1993); Grievance Comm. for Hartford-New Britain
Judicial Dist. v. Trantolo, 470 A.2d 228, 232 (Conn. 1984); In re Victor B., 646 A.2d 1012,
1017 (Md. 1994); Gannett River States Pub. Co. v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and
Disability Comm'n, 801 S.W.2d 292, 294-95 (Ark. 1990); Green v. Lewis Truck Lines, Inc.,
443 S.E.2d 906, 908 (S.C. 1994).
53.
Patterson.456 U.S. at 63.
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employees, as well as with race and sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII in an action filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 4
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's determination that the
"petitioners' seniority, promotion, and job classification practices violated
Title VII"; however, the Court of Appeals remanded the case "for further
proceedings with respect to remedy., 55 However, "on remand [the]
petitioners moved to vacate the District Court's orders and to dismiss the
respondents' complaints" 56 based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Teamsters v. United States57 where the Court held that section 703(h) of the
Civil Rights Act insulated "bona fide seniority systems from attack even
though they may have discriminatory impact on minorities. 5 8 The District
Court denied the motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision. 59 The Fourth Circuit held en banc that Congress intended
that section 703(h)'s seniority system immunity would only apply to
systems that existed at the time Title VII became effective and to the
application of such post-Act systems. 6° Section 703(h) "provides in
pertinent part: 'Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system.
S. .,6 However, the Supreme Court, utilizing statutory construction,
reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision finding that section 703(h) made no
distinction between pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems; therefore, the
plain language of section 703(h) foreclosed the limitation applied to the
statute by the Court of Appeals.6 2
The PattersonCourt's decision is a good example of the proper use of
statutory construction; however, it also reflects the corollary rule to the
plain language canon of statutory construction that a court "will not depart
from the plain statutory language by reading into it exceptions, limitations,
or conditions that are in conflict with the express legislative intent. Further,
a court may not 63
inject provisions that are in conflict with the express
legislative intent.,
54.
Id. at 65-67.
55.
Id. at 67.
56. Id.
57.
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
58. Patterson,456 U.S. at 67.
59.
Id.
60. Id. at 67-68.
61.
Id. at 64-65 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)).
62. Id. at 64-77.
63.
People v. Roberts, 824 N.E.2d 250, 256 (Ill. 2005) (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979); A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling,
324 U.S. 490 (1945):

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

1. An exhaustive look at case law applying statutoryconstruction in cases
involving the scope of the prosecution'sduty of disclosure under criminal discovery statutes and court rules
In United States v. Freedman, the district court, pursuant to a pretrial
discovery order, required the prosecution to copy discoverable documents
and to pay the cost of such reproduction, 64 which was estimated to be
approximately $17, 250.65 The prosecution refused to comply with the
discovery order to make the copies, and subsequently appealed pursuant to
a requested order of exclusion that provided the prosecution with "a
statutorily prescribed basis of appeal." 66 On appeal, the issue before the
Eleventh Circuit was "whether the trial court abused its discretion in
granting the appellee's discovery motion, which required the government at
its own expense to supply copies of the material documents to the criminal
defendants. 67 Although recognizing that Federal Rule 16 did not expressly
prohibit a trial court from entering such an order and acknowledging the
68
discretionary latitude a trial court enjoys under the discovery provision,
the Freedman Court concluded that an order requiring the prosecution to
copy discoverable materials, and to pay the costs of such reproduction was
contrary to the plain language of Rule 16.69 Therefore, the court held that
Any exemption from such . .. legislation must therefore be narrowly
construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory language
and the intent of Congress. To extend an exemption to other than
those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the
interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.
Id. at 493; Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York v. Nardelli, 286 F.2d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 1961)
(stating that it could not "read ... an exception into a statute clear on its face"); Coleman v.
State, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (Md. 1977) ("[A] court may not as a general rule surmise a legislative
intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or insert exceptions not made by the
legislature.").
688 F.2d 1364, 1365 (11" Cir. 1982).
64.
See id. at 1365, n.2.
65.
Id. at 1365.
66.
Id. at 1366.
67.
Id.
68.
69.
The Freedman Court stated that:
To mandate that the government expend both its valuable time and funds
in copying documents which the defendants have requested, when Rule
16 does not expressly require such, constitutes an abuse of the trial
court's discretion and places an unjustifiable expense on the United
States Government... The trial court has not only failed to eliminate unjustifiable expense, it has created an excessive expense on the government by ordering it to furnish three copies of the requested documents
when Rule 16 does not expressly obligate the government to make even
one copy of the documents.
Id. (emphasis added).

20061

CRIMINAL DISCO VERYAND THE COSTS OF RE-PRODUCTION

the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the government to copy and
pay the costs of the reproduction of the discoverable documents.7 °
According to dicta in United States v. Gleason, the Second Circuit would
agree with the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the plain language of
Federal Rule 16 regarding the prosecution's obligation under the provision.7' Similarly, the commentary to the ABA Standards explicitly states
that the prosecution is not required to copy discoverable materials for the
defense. 2 Furthermore, several state court decisions also support the
contention that the plain language of the discovery provisions, which
requires the prosecution to make the discoverable material available and
permit the defense to copy73it, does not require the prosecution to copy the
material for the defendant.
Idaho's criminal discovery rule requires the prosecutor to disclose
discoverable material and permit the defendant upon written request "to
inspect and copy or photograph" the material.74 In State v. Van Sickle, the
defendant was convicted by a jury on a misdemeanor driving while under
the influence charge. 75 The defendant appealed the conviction based on the
admissibility of two exhibits (the calibration certificate and the printout of
the breathalyzer test results), arguing that the trial judge should have
excluded the evidence because of the prosecutor's failure to comply with
the defendant's discovery request that sought production of the two
documents. 76 The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction,7 7 holding that the language of Idaho's Criminal Rule 16 only requires
that the prosecution make the material available for the defendant to copy;
70. Freedman, 688 F.2d at 1367.
71.
See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 25 (2d Cir. 1979) ("With respect to
such material, if any obligation to disclose existed under Rule 16(a) it was satisfied by
making the underlying files available to the defendant prior to trial.").
72.

ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY THIRD

74.

IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(l), (2), (4), (5) (West 2005). But see IDAHO R. CRIM.

EDITION Standard 11-2.1, cmt. standard 11-2.1(a) (1996):
The prosecution is not required to deliver to defense counsel or the defendant the discovery materials to be produced or to make a copy of
those documents. It is sufficient to make such materials available for the
defense to inspect and copy (or, where relevant, photograph or test),
whether at the prosecutor's office or at another suitable location.
Id.
State v. Van Sickle, 813 P.2d 910 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); State v. Flynn, 479
73.
N.W.2d 477 (N.D. 1992); see also State v. Matt, 799 P.2d 1085 (Mont.1990); State v.
Addicks, 579 P.2d 289 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
P. 16(a),(b)(3), (7) (requiring the prosecution to "disclose" material that tends to negate the
defendant's guilt or reduce the punishment, and requires the prosecution to "furnish" the
defendant's prior record and any police reports regarding the prosecution of the case.).
75.
Van Sickle, 813 P.2d at 911.
76.
Id.
77. Id. at 915.
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it does not78require the prosecution to provide copies of the materials to the
defendant.
In State v. Matt, the defendant was convicted of domestic violence and
tampering with a witness. 79 The defendant argued, inter alia, that the
prosecution violated the trial court's discovery order because the prosecution failed to provide the defendant with copies of discoverable material.8 0
The prosecution argued that according to state law,8 1 the prosecution was
only required to "'make available to the defendant for examination and
production' all relevant documents, ' 82 and that the prosecution complied
with this provision by giving the defendant full opportunity to inspect the
State's files.83 Noting that the defendant did not take advantage of the
opportunity to inspect the prosecution's evidence, the Supreme Court of
Montana ruled in favor of the State and found that the defendant failed to
show that the prosecution violated the discovery provision because there
was "no evidence that the State refused any request by defense counsel to
examine any relevant evidence. 84 Implicit in the Matt court's decision is
that the prosecution is not required to copy discoverable material and
provide it to the defense.85
Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court has determined that the
language of North Dakota's criminal discovery rule forecloses a requirement that the prosecution provide copies of discoverable material to the
defense.86 North Dakota's Rule 16 provides that "[u]pon written request of
a defendant, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant and
make available for inspection, copying, or photographing" certain
discoverable materials. 87 In State v. Flynn, the defendant was convicted by
a jury of theft of services; however, the defendant appealed asserting, inter
alia, that the trial judge erred in admitting certain evidence because the
prosecution violated the discovery rule by failing to provide the defendant
with copies of the evidence as requested by the defense.8 8 The Flynn Court
rejected the defendant's argument that the prosecution violated the
discovery rule, holding that the discovery rule only requires that the
78.
Id. at 912.
79.
799 P.2d at 1086.
80.
Id. at 1088.
81.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-322(1) (West 2005).
82.
Matt, 799 P.2d at 1088 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-322(1)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85.
See id.
86.
State v. Flynn, 479 N.W.2d 477, 479 (N.D. 1992).
87.
N.D. R. CRim. P. 16(a)(1)(A),(C), (D) (West 2005). But see N.D. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(1)(B) (requiring the prosecution to "furnish" the defendant a copy of the defendant's
criminal record).
88.
Flynn, 479 N.W.2d at 478.
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prosecution make the discoverable material available to the defendant;
it
89
"does not require the State to provide copies of such documents."
Furthermore, in State v. Addicks, where the defendant argued that the
trial court erred in its finding that the prosecution complied with pretrial
discovery, the Court of Appeals of Oregon concluded that:
The statutory obligation "to afford the adverse party an opportunity to inspect or copy material" does not require the
prosecutor to deliver it to defense counsel at his office or to
defendant at his home or jail cell. The obligation is fulfilled where, as here, the material was available to defendant or his representative at the prosecutor's office. 9°
Accordingly, the Addicks Court held that the prosecution did not violate the
discovery provision by refusing to deliver the discoverable materials to the
defendant in jail where the prosecutor made the material available but the
defendant failed to take advantage of the opportunity. 9 1 It may be implied
from this decision that the Addicks Court's interpretation of the language of
Oregon's discovery provision also does not require the prosecution to92make
copies of the discoverable material and deliver them to the defendant.
2. Statutory constructionand whether a prosecutor'soffice can charge a
privately-retaineddefense attorneyfor the costs of reproduction
In order to answer the question whether the prosecution can charge
privately-retained defense attorneys for the costs incurred as a result of the
reproduction of discoverable material the defense requests via discovery, a
court must look to the relevant discovery statute or rule because discovery
is governed by statutes or court rules in the federal system as well as nearly
all of the state systems. 93 Therefore, a court's interpretation of the
particular statute or rule will be resolved by the process of statutory
construction and its various canons, particularly the plain language canon. 94
The provision that is relevant to answering the proposed question is the
provision delineating the prosecution's obligation with respect to disclosing
discoverable material. As noted above, the majority of the discovery
statutes and rules articulate the prosecutor's obligation as a duty to make
89.
90.
91.
92.

93.

Id. at 479.
579 P.2d at 291 (quoting OR. REV.STAT. § 135.805(2) (West 2005)).
Id. at 291.
See id.
LAFAVE ET AL.,

supra note 19, at §20.2 (b).

94.
E.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); U.S. v.
Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997).
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discoverable material available to the defense and to permit inspection or
reproduction of the material. 95 The plain language of this provision is
unambiguous, and clearly does not require the prosecution to make copies
of the discoverable material and tender it to the defense upon request. 9 A
conclusion that logically flows from this deduction is that the prosecution
can therefore charge the defense for the costs the prosecution may incur as
a result of reproducing the discoverable material. To hold to the contrary,
and thus require the prosecution to bear the cost of reproduction, would
essentially be requiring the prosecution to make the copies of the material,
and this would be in conflict with the plain language of the particular
statute or rule. 97 Consequently, such a holding would be reading an
exception into the statute or court rule in conflict with the expressed
legislative intent, and this is an action a court will not undertake. 98
Therefore, the plain language of the criminal discovery provisions relating
to a prosecutor's obligation of disclosure supports the contention that the
prosecution may charge privately-retained defense counsel for the costs the

95.
E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B),(E),(F); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. §223212(a),(b) (2005) (a representative of the first category of state provisions similar to the
Federal Rule, LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 19, at §20.2(b), n. 25); ILL. S. CT. R. 412 (e)(i-ii)
(2005) (a representative of the second category of state provisions similar to the ABA
Standards, LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, at §20.2(b), n. 26); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R.
16(a)(1)(A), (C), (D) (2005) (a representative of the third category of state provisions that
fall somewhere between the Federal Rule and the ABA Standards, LAFAVE Ex AL., supra
note 19, at §20.2(b), n. 27); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL
BY JURY THIRD EDITION Standard 11-2.1 (1996). But see MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.201(A),(G)
(2005) (the prosecutor must provide discoverable material to the defendant); N.H. R. SUPER.
CT. 98(A)(1),(2) (2005) (the prosecutor "shall provide" a copy to the defendant); N.J. R.
CRIM. P. 3:13-3(b) (2005) (the prosecutor must supply a copy of discovery of post
indictment).
96.
Van Sickle, 813 P.2d at 910; Flynn, 479 N.W.2d at 477; see also Matt, 799 P.2d
at 1085; Addicks, 579 P.2d at 289.
97.
See Van Sickle, 813 P.2d at 910; Flynn, 479 N.W.2d at 477; Matt, 799 P.2d at
1085; Addicks, 579 P.2d at 289.
98.
Roberts, 824 N.E.2d at 256 (citation omitted); see also United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979); A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493
(1945):
Any exemption from such . . . legislation must therefore be narrowly
construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory language
and the intent of Congress. To extend an exemption to other than those
plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.
Id. at 493. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York v. Nardelli, 286 F.2d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 1961)
(the Court stated that it could not "read ... an exception into a statute clear on its face.");
Coleman v. State, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (Md. 1977) ("a court may not as a general rule surmise a
legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or insert exceptions not made
by the legislature.").
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prosecution incurs in the reproduction of discoverable material that the
defense requests via discovery.
B.

PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT THE COMMENT'S

CONTENTION

Public policy also supports the contention that prosecutors should be
able to charge privately-retained defense attorneys for the costs the
prosecution bears as a result of reproducing materials requested by the
defense via discovery. The supporting public policy is evident in statutes
regarding the disclosure of public records, the imposition of costs upon
defendants in criminal proceedings, and an indigent defendant's right to
counsel.
Public policy is a vague concept, and there is no precise definition
governing its meaning or interpretation." However, the Supreme Court has
provided guidance by concluding that "public policy" may be abstracted
from a state's constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions, and that
"[p]rimarily it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the
'' l° Justice Ryan,
state.
an Illinois
Supreme
Court Justice, has elaborated on
the meaning
of public policy
by defining
it as:
[The] principle of law which declares that no one may lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public welfare or to be against the public good. Stating the
converse of this definition, it can be said that public policy
favors that which has a tendency to be beneficial to the
public welfare or to be for the public good ...
.In view of
such a general definition, the correctness of the statement
99. Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931);
Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981). Black's Law Dictionary
defines public policy as follows:
1. Broadly, principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by
the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of
society. Courts sometimes use the term to justify their decisions, as
when declaring a contract void because it is "contrary to public policy.".

2. More narrowly, the principle that a person should not be allowed to
do anything that would tend to injure the public at large.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed. 2004).
100.
Building Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339
U.S. 532, 537-38 (1950). See also Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. at 357 ("In
determining... public policy.., the Constitution, laws, and judicial decisions of
that state, and as well the applicable principles of the common law, are to be
considered. Primarily it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the
state."); Palmateer,421 N.E.2d at 878.
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that public policy is a vague expression and is not subject
to precise definition cannot be questioned.' 0 '
1. Public policy supporting the contention can be found in "freedom of
information" statutes
10 2
In 1966, Congress adopted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 0 3
"for the express purpose of increasing disclosure of government records."'
The Supreme Court noted that open access to public records was necessary
to establish an informed citizenry, which in turn was essential to the
democratic form of government because it served as a check on corruption
and held the government accountable to the people."°4 After the enactment
of the FOIA, every state that did not already have an open records statute of
its own passed similar open records statutes entitling the public to a right of
access to state and local government information. 0 5 The FOIA, and its
state-level counterparts, established a public right to obtain governmental
information that is judicially enforceable.' °6 Notwithstanding this public
right, Congress determined that the taxpayers should not have to bear the
cost of reproducing material requested under the statute and allowed an
agency to charge requesters of FOIA information for the costs of reproduction; 10 7 however, the fees may be waived if the information being requested
is determined to be in the public interest. 108 Likewise, every state in the
union, including the District of Columbia, allows the state or local
governmental agency to charge a fee for copies made of information
requested via the open records statutes.1°9

101.
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 882 (Ryan J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
102.
Act of September 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383, amended by Act of
June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 56 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1970)).
103.
Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1304 (8th Cir. 1978).
104.
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1989).
105.
Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28
URB. LAW. 65, 65 (Winter 1996).
106.
See Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
107.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2004).
108.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (2004).
109.
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1.212 (West 2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-532(b)
(West 2005); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66.7(b) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-71
(West 2005); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 15.234 (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91A:4 (West 2005): R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-4(a) (West 2005); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
552.261 (Vernon 2005). While every state allows a government agency to charge for
making copies of requested information subject to the open records statutes, all but two of
them do so statutorily. A Tennessee Court has interpreted that state's open records statute as
allowing the fee, Waller v. Bryan, 16 S.W.3d 770, 774 (E.S. 1999), and an Attorney General
Opinion has determined that South Dakota's statute also allows a charge. 1996 S.D. Op.
Att'y Gen. 51, 5 (1996).
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Pursuant to the FOIA, every federal agency is required to establish
regulations providing the schedule of fees applicable to processing FOIA
requests." 0 The fee schedules created by the agencies must conform to the
guidelines issued by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)."' The OMB published the Uniform Freedom of Information Act
Fee Schedule and Guidelines in 1987 pursuant to its duty to promulgate a
uniform schedule of fees for federal agencies. 1 2 However, nothing in 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) supersedes the fees established by a statute that sets
the level of chargeable fees for specific types of records. 113 To satisfy such
a statute, the OMB has stated that the purpose behind setting the level of
fees for particular records must be in order to: (1) serve the general public
by facilitating the availability of government information; (2) ensure that
requesters bear the costs for their special use, rather than the tax-payers; (3)
operate the system on a no-cost basis, to the extent possible; and (4)
reimburse the Treasury for funding used to disseminate the public
4 What is relevant about this information is that by enumeratinformation. 11
ing the necessary objectives a statute must satisfy in order for it not to be
superseded by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A), the OMB is implicitly stating the
reasons why the government requires reimbursement for the costs of
reproducing records requested via the FOIA. 1 5 Essentially, these reasons
or objectives are for the purpose of serving the public welfare or public
good; therefore, the statutory provisions affording the imposition of fees for
reproduction reflect Justice Ryan's definition of "public policy. ' 1 6 As a
result, a proposition may be implied that the public policy of the states, as
well as the nation, is that taxpayers should not have to bear the costs of
reproducing information for the convenience of individuals of the public even when those individuals have a public right to the information.
2. Publicpolicy supporting the contention can also be found in statutes
regardingthe assessment of costs in criminalprosecutions
Additional support that as a matter of public policy a prosecutor's
office should be able to charge a privately-retained defense attorney for the
costs of reproducing material pursuant to a defense counsel's discovery
request is evident in the assessment of costs in criminal prosecutions. At
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (2004).
110.
Id.
111.
112.
OMB Uniform FOIA Fee Schedule and Guidelines §1, 52 Fed. Reg. 10017
(Mar. 27, 1987).
113.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vi) (2004).
OMB Uniform FOIA Fee Schedule and Guidelines §6(b), 52 Fed. Reg. 10017.
114.
115.
See id.
dissenting).
See Palmateer421 N.E.2d at 882 (Ryan, J.,
116.
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common law, the practice of imposing costs of prosecution on a convicted
defendant was unknown; 1 7 therefore, the assessment of such costs must be
promulgated by the legislature. 1 8 However, the legislative scheme of
imposing costs upon a defendant has been a "long-standing practice," and
the federal statutes, as well as most state statutes, now allow or even
compel the imposition of trial costs upon the defendant in criminal cases. 19
Allowable costs "generally include witness fees, transcript costs, and fees
of court officers."' 120 There are three suggested rationales that support the
taxation of costs on a defendant in a criminal proceeding, which include
"recovery of a portion of the expenses attributable to the defendant's
wrongdoing, . .. punishment of the defendant by increasing the penalty
upon conviction[, . .. [and] discouragement of frivolous trial tactics and
pointless trials ....
, While the latter two may be flawed, 22 the recovery
of expenses from the public coffer attributable to the defendant's violation
of the law is a legitimate concern.
The court in McKee v. State123 adequately reflects the policy behind
this rationale. The McKee Court recognized that every trial involved an
overhead expense incurred by the state and county because of the commission of crimes and misdemeanors; noting that such expense included items
"such as per diem of the grand jurors, the per diem of the sheriff and of the
trial jurors, the salary of the judge, and other expenses."' 24 As a result, the
McKee Court concluded that "it is therefore manifestly within the right of
the state government, through its legislative representatives, to require that
those who cause this expense should be made to bear it.' 25 Common sense
dictates that legislative enactments that require the reimbursement of
taxpayer revenue, especially for losses attributable to violations of the law,
have "a tendency to be beneficial to the public welfare or to be for the
public good."' 126 Therefore, statutes that allow or compel the taxation of
costs upon a defendant reflect legislative intent that, as a matter of public
policy, the government, and ultimately the taxpayers, should not have to
bear the costs incurred as a result of a violation of the law.

117.
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
118.
United States ex rel. Phillips v. Gaines, 1880 WL 18566 (U.S. Tenn. 1880).
119.
Comment, Charging Costs of Prosecutionto the Defendant, 59 GEO. L.J. 991,
991 (1970-71).
120.
Id. at 991.
121.
Id. at 998.
122.
Id. at 999-1004.
123.
218 S.W. 233 (Tenn. 1920).
124.
McKee, 218 S.W. at 236.
125.
Id.

126.

Palmateer,421 N.E.2d at 882 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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3. Furthermore,public policy supporting the contention can be found in
recoupment statutes
Further evidence that public policy supports a prosecutor's ability to
require a privately-retained defense attorney to reimburse the prosecutor's
office for the costs of reproducing discoverable material can be found in
federal and state recoupment statutes. The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' 127 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing representation by counsel to the indigent in state courts for felony
charges. 28 Subsequent to the decision, the right to counsel evolved to
encompass multiple stages of a trial, as well as misdemeanors and
appeals. 129 This expansion resulted in increased "fiscal demands and state
budget crises", and the federal and state legislators reacted by enacting
recoupment or reimbursement statutes to defray some of the costs.130 These
statutes allow the government to recover defense costs from the indigent
defendant.' 31 For example, 18 U.S.C. §3006A(f) provides that:
Whenever the United States magistrate or the court finds
that funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a
person furnished representation, it may authorize or direct
that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney, to the bar
association or legal aid agency or community defender organization which provided the appointed attorney, to any
person or organization authorized pursuant to subsection
(e) to render investigative, expert, or other services, or to
the court for deposit in the Treasury as a reimbursement to
the appropriation, current at the time
of payment, to carry
32
out the provisions of this section.

127.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
128.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
129.
Lynn Rosenstock, Indigent Defense, 28 CHAMPION 50, 50 (Aug. 2004).
130.
Id.
131.
Wayne Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal
Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice
for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 181, 183 (1998).

132.

18 U.S.C. §3006A(f) (2002).
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The Supreme Court confronted the constitutionality of reimbursement
statutes in Rinaldi v. Yeager'33 and James v. Strange;134 however, the Court
did not address the issue of whether it was constitutional to charge indigent
defendants for the costs related to their defense.135 Instead, the Rinaldi
Court struck down a New Jersey reimbursement statute as unconstitutional
because it violated Equal Protection, 36 and the James Court struck down a
similar Kansas statute on the same grounds. 137 However, the Court alluded
to the legitimacy of such reimbursement statutes within its decisions. In
Rinaldi, the Court assumed "that a legislature could validly provide for
replenishing a county treasury from the pockets of those who have directly
benefited from county expenditures."' 138 The Court, in James, went even
further and made sure to note:
[T]hat the state interests represented by recoupment laws
may prove important ones. Recoupment proceedings may
protect the State from fraudulent concealment of assets and
false assertions of indigency. Many States, moreover, face
expanding criminal dockets, and this Court has required
appointed counsel or indigents in widening classes of cases
and stages of prosecution. Such trends have heightened the
burden on public revenues, and recoupment laws reflect
legislative efforts to recover some of the added costs. Finally, federal dominance of the Nation's major revenue
sources has encouraged state and local governments to seek
new methods of conserving public funds, not only through
the recoupment of indigents' counsel fees but other forms
of public assistance as well. 139
In Fuller v. Oregon,140 the Court was finally given the opportunity to
address the issue of whether an indigent criminal defendant can be
constitutionally required to pay for the legal services provided by a court on
the defendant's behalf when the defendant subsequently acquires the means
to afford the costs. 14 1 In Fuller,the defendant pleaded guilty to sodomy in
the third degree. 142 Upon the defendant's declaration that he was unable to
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

384 U.S. 305 (1966).
407 U.S. 128 (1972).
See generally Rinaldi, 384 U.S. 305; James, 407 U.S. 128.
Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309.
James, 407 U.S. at 142.
Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309.
James, 407 U.S. at 141 (footnotes omitted).
417 U.S. 40 (1974).
Id. at 40.
Id.at41.
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afford an attorney, the defendant was appointed counsel on a finding of
indigence, and was represented by the court appointed attorney at his plea
hearing, as well as other proceedings. 143 The defendant was sentenced to
five years of probation conditioned upon, inter alia, the reimbursement of
the fees and expenses incurred by the county as a result of the appointment
of the county funded defense attorney and investigator. 144 The Oregon
Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.1 45 The Fuller Court rejected the defendant's equal protection
clause and infringement upon the right to counsel arguments, 146 and upheld
the Oregon statute 147 that required:
[T]hat in some cases all or part of the "expenses specially
incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant," be repaid to the State, and that when a convicted person is
placed on probation repayment of such expenses may be
made a condition of probation. These expenses
include the
48
costs of the convicted person's legal defense.1
Presently, every state in the nation, as well as the federal government,
has "some type of cost-recoupment system."'' 49 These reimbursement
systems obviously have a "tendency to be beneficial to the public welfare or
to be for the public good."' 150 The recoupment schemes have the potential
of protecting a state "from fraudulent concealment of assets and false
assertions of indigency.' 151 Furthermore, due to the expansion of the right
to counsel after the decision in Gideon, in conjunction with expanding
criminal dockets, public revenues have suffered a heightened burden, and
the recoupment statutes provide a legitimate means to alleviate the negative
impact on public funds. 152 The various recoupment schemes across the
nation reflect legitimate concerns over the loss of public funds, and
establish potentially effective methods for replenishing some of the lost
revenues. Moreover, the systems reflect that, as a matter of public policy,
the taxpayers should not have to bear the costs of a criminal defendant's

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
omitted).
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at42.
Id.
Fuller,417 U.S. at 46-53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 43 (citing OR. REV.

STAT.

§ 161.665 (1973)) (citation and footnotes

State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 104 (Alaska 1995).
Palmateer., 421 N.E.2d at 882 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
James, 407 U.S. at 141.
See id. at 141.
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when the defendant is constitutionally entitled to such a
defense, 15even
3
defense.
55
154
The Freedom of Information Act and analogous state provisions
reflect public policy that taxpayers should not have to bear the costs of
reproducing information for the convenience of individuals of the public even when those individuals have a public right to the information.
Furthermore, statutes that impose the costs related to trial proceedings upon
criminal defendants 156 evidence public policy that the government, and
ultimately the taxpayers, should not have to bear the costs incurred as a
result of a violation of the law. Moreover, statutes that allow the government to recoup the costs of appointed counsel from an indigent defendant
when that defendant subsequently acquires the means to do Sol57 reflects
public policy that, notwithstanding the constitutional right to the representation, taxpayers should not have to bear the costs related to a defendant's
defense. Therefore, the statutes governing the disclosure of public records,
the allocation of costs to the defendant in criminal prosecutions, and the
recoupment of costs incurred as a result of the appointment of counsel to
indigent defendants, reflect national public policy that supports the
contention that prosecutors may charge privately-retained defense attorneys
for the costs involved in reproducing discoverable material requested by
defense counsel because, essentially, the costs of making the copies are
being imposed upon the public for the convenience of the defendant, and
moreover, the taxpayers are bearing the costs of the defendant's defense
when the defendant can afford to do so.

153. See Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309 ("We may assume that a legislature could validly
provide for replenishing a county treasury from the pockets of those who have directly
benefited from county expenditures.); see also People v. Smith, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856, 864
(1st Dist. 2000) ('The obvious purpose of section 987.8 is to require criminal defendants to
reimburse the county for the costs of their trial when, at the conclusion of trial, they have the
present ability to do so .... This recoupment statute reflects a strong legislative policy of
shifting the costs of trial from the taxpayers to the defendant.").
154. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
155. E.g., ALA. CODE. ANN.§ 36-12-40, 41 (2001 & Supp. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN.
29, § 10001-2 (2003); 5 ILL. COmp. STAT. ANN. 140/1, 3, 6 (West 2005).
tit.
156.
Comment, Charging Costs of Prosecution to the Defendant, 59 GEO. L.J. 991,
991 (1970-71).
157. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §3006A(f) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-40 (2004); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 815.13 (West 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 600.090 (West 2004).

20061

CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AND THE COSTS OF RE-PRODUCTION

IV. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
The expense of reproducing discoverable material is costly, 58 and will
continue to rise in the future.159 Consequently, because discovery is almost
exclusively governed by statutes and court rules, 16° this Comment recommends that state legislators and policymakers take action to alleviate the
present and future burden on public revenue by amending their present
discovery provisions to include an ability to charge for the costs related to
the reproduction of discoverable material. Five states have taken such
163
16 1
Georgia, 162 Minnesota,
action; they include the states of Colorado,
New York, 164 and Oklahoma. 65 Additionally, New Mexico and Pennsyl66
vania allude to such an allowance in the commentary to their court rules.'
This Comment commends the foregoing states' legislators for assuming the
responsibility of amending their state statutes or court rules to prevent
public revenue from being distributed on the behalf of and for the convenience of criminal defendants who can afford defense counsel, and it is the
recommendation of this Comment that the remaining states take action and
amend their statutes or court rules to reflect the same.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue this Comment addresses is whether a prosecutor's office
may charge privately-retained defense attorneys for the costs the office may
158.
See United States v. Freedman, 688 F.2d 1364, 1365, n.2 (11th Cir. 1982)
(indicating that the cost of reproducing the discoverable material in Freedman was
approximately $17,250).
159.
See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141 (1972) (noting the expansion in
criminal dockets, and thus the implication that discovery requests are also increasing); see
also Daniel B. Garrie et al., Electronic Discovery and the Challenge Posed by the SarbanesOxley Act, 2005 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 2 (Spring 2005) (recognizing the move from paper
discovery to electronic discovery, the authors noted that the costs of digital discovery has the
potential to exceed the costs of paper discovery).
160.
LAFAVE, supra note 19, at §20.2(b).
161.
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16(Part V)(c) (Supp. 2005).
162.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-9 (2004).
163.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.03 (subd. 10) (Supp. 2005).
164.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.70(3) (McKinney 2002).
165.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2002(F) (West 2003).
166.
N.M. R. MAG. CT. CRIM. P. 6-504 committee's commentary (2005) ("The
expense of copying or photographing is to be paid by the party requesting a copy or
photograph."); PA. R. CRIM. P. 573 comment (Supp. 2005) ("The attorney for the
Commonwealth should not charge the defendant for the costs of copying pretrial discovery
materials. However, nothing in this rule is intended to preclude the attorney for the
Commonwealth, on a case-by-case basis, from requesting an order for the defendant to pay
the copying costs."). See also N.M. R. METRO. CT. CRIM. P. 7-504 advisory committee's
note (2005); N.M. R. MUN. CT. CRIM. P. 8-504 advisory committee's note (2005).
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incur as a result of reproducing material that may be requested via
discovery. Although criminal discovery has evolved over time and resulted
in variations regarding the approaches and scope of discovery, the majority
of discovery statutes and rules delineate that the prosecutor's duty of
disclosure is to make the particular material available and to permit its
inspection and reproduction. Utilizing the rule of statutory construction, it
is the contention of this Comment that to forbid a prosecutor from charging
for the costs involved in copying material is contrary to the plain language
of the discovery statutes and rules, and would be implicitly requiring the
prosecutor to make the copies of the material. Such a requirement would be
reading an exception or limitation into the discovery provisions, and thus,
would be violating the rule of statutory construction - an action courts do
not undertake. Additionally, public policy supports the contention of this
Comment and is reflected in statutes that: (1) govern access to public
records; (2) govern the imposition of the costs of criminal proceedings upon
the defendant; and (3) require defendants previously found to be indigent to
reimburse the government for the costs of the defendant's court appointed
defense. Essentially, the public policy evident in these statutes supports the
proposition that taxpayers should not have to bear the costs of reproducing
material for a defendant's criminal defense when the defendant can afford
the costs of that defense, notwithstanding the defendant's statutory or a
constitutional right to the material. Therefore, a prosecutor may charge
privately-retained defense attorneys for the costs of reproducing discoverable material that a defense attorney requests via discovery. However,
given the fact that discovery is almost exclusively promulgated by statute or
court rule, it is the recommendation of this Comment that legislators follow
the example set forth by the states of Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, New
York, and Oklahoma, and amend their current discovery provisions so as to
provide that a prosecutor has the ability to charge privately-retained defense
attorney's for discovery reproduction costs. Such measures will help
alleviate the present and future burden placed on the public revenue.
GARY C. PINTER

